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* A version of this article was originally published as John Monahan
and  Laurens Walker, Judicial Use of Social Science Research. 15 LAW
AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 571 (1991). It is reprinted with the kind per-
mission of Springer Science and Business Media, and has been thor-
oughly updated for COURT REVIEW.
Footnotes
1. Many of the cases discussed here can be found in John MONAHAN
& LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
(6th ed.  2006) [hereinafter SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW]. 
2. 208 U.S. 412 (1908). 
3. Id. at 420. 
4. Id. at 421.
5. Kenneth C. Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the
Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364 (1942) [hereinafter
Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence]. Davis’s concepts were
originally advanced in the context of administrative law, but they
were rapidly generalized to other areas of the law.
6. The concept of legislative fact “has been widely accepted in the
federal appellate courts.” Broz v. Schweiker, 677 F.2d 1351, 1357
(11th Cir. 1982). The United States Supreme Court has invoked
the term on numerous occasions, e.g., Lockhart v. McCree, 476
U.S. 162, 169 n. 3 (1986); Concerned Citizens v. Pine Creek
Conservancy Dist., 429 U.S. 651, 656-57 (1977);.
7. Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence, supra note 5, at 402.
8. Id. at 364.
Since the first glimmerings of legal realism early in thiscentury, American courts have been remarkably open tousing social science research when that research could
help resolve empirical issues that arise in litigation.
Increasingly in recent decades, courts have sought out research
data on their own when the parties have failed to provide
them. Social scientists, for their part, are investigating ques-
tions of judicial interest at an accelerating pace. In this article,
we examine the three principal uses that courts have found for
social science research.1 For each use, we review early and cur-
rent approaches to dealing with social science in court. We
conclude by offering judges a step-by-step guide to incorpo-
rating social science research in cases that call for a determina-
tion of empirical issues.
Social science research was first urged upon an American
court in 1908 by Louis Brandeis in Muller v. Oregon,2 a land-
mark case dealing with the constitutionality of social welfare
legislation limiting the work day of any female employed in a
factory or laundry to ten hours. Brandeis assembled a substan-
tial body of medical and social science research tending to
show the debilitating effect on women and girls of working
long hours, and presented this material to the United States
Supreme Court in a brief defending Oregon’s limits on the
number of hours females could be employed. In the opinion in
Muller upholding the legislation, after referring to the social
science materials in a lengthy footnote, the Court stated that
although they “may not be, technically speaking, authorities,”3
the studies would nonetheless receive “judicial cognizance.”4
Although the use of what came to be known as “Brandeis
briefs” became common in the years after Muller, legal com-
mentators were hard pressed to explain an apparent anomaly:
How was it that Brandeis could present research to an appellate
court in a written brief, when “facts” were supposed to be
introduced at the trial level by the oral testimony of witnesses?
This conundrum persisted until the late Kenneth Culp Davis,
in a seminal article published in 1942, distinguished two types
of “fact.”5 The first type, legislative fact, referred to facts that
were used by courts to help decide broad questions of law or
policy, as Brandeis had used research to help decide the con-
stitutionality of social welfare legislation. The second type,
adjudicative fact, referred to facts that were used to decide
questions of interest only to the specific parties to a lawsuit,
such as whether a particular traffic light was red or green.
Davis’s distinction soon became widely accepted and now
forms the traditional scheme used by courts and commentators
to describe the judicial uses of social science.6 As the following
sections make clear, Davis’s concepts have been severely criti-
cized in recent years and may well have outlived their useful-
ness as tools for managing the introduction of empirical infor-
mation in contemporary American law.
USING SOCIAL SCIENCE TO MAKE LAW
Early Approaches
Professor Davis defined legislative facts as follows:
“When an agency [or court] wrestles with a question of law
or policy, it is acting legislatively, [and] the facts which inform
its legislative judgment may conveniently be denominated leg-
islative facts.”7
Legislative facts, in other words, are facts that courts use
when they make law (or “legislate”), rather than simply apply
settled doctrine to resolve a dispute between particular parties
to a case. Whereas the determination of adjudicative facts
affects only the litigants before the court, the determination of
legislative facts influences the content of legal doctrine itself
and, therefore, affects many parties in addition to those who
brought the case. It was Professor Davis’s position that “the
rules of evidence for finding facts which form the basis for cre-
ation of law and determination of policy should differ from the
rules for finding facts which concern only the parties to a par-
ticular case.”8 In this manner Davis justified the Supreme
Court’s practice in Muller of disregarding the rules of evidence
by accepting “facts” on appeal and in a brief. The rules of evi-
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Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L.
REV. 477 (1986).
17. STEPHEN SALTZBURG & KENNETH REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE MANUAL 43 (3d ed. 1982).
18. JOHN STRONG, KENNETH BROWN, GEORGE DIX, EDWARD
IMWINKELRIED, D. KAYE, ROBERT MOSTELLER & E. ROBERTS,
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 503 (5th ed. 1999). Strong, et al. sum-
marize our approach at 499.
9. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
10. Id. at 494.
11. See SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW, supra note 1, at 185-382. 
12. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
13. Id. at 560 (citing Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).
14. Advisory Committee Note to Fed. R. Evid. 201(a). 
15. Id.
16. See John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority:  Obtaining,
dence did not apply to Brandeis’s social science materials: They
were “legislative” facts.
Judicial acceptance of social science research as a form of
legislative fact became commonplace throughout the law after
Brown v. Board of Education.9 In that case, the United States
Supreme Court cited the published research of numerous social
scientists to support its empirical assertion that the segregation
of public schools instills in an African-American child “a sense
of inferiority [that] affects the motivation of a child to learn.”10
In the decades since Brown, research has frequently been
invoked by courts to demonstrate the validity of empirical
assumptions made in the process of modifying existing law or
creating new law.11 In Roper v. Simmons,12 for example, the
Supreme Court considered the question of whether the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments permitted the execution of
offenders who were under the age of 18 at the time they com-
mitted a capital crime. The Court held that the Constitution
prohibited such executions. In arriving at this conclusion, the
Court noted that “as the scientific and sociological studies
respondent and his amici cite tend to confirm, ‘[a] lack of matu-
rity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in
youth more often than in adults and are more understandable
among the young. These qualities often result in impetuous and
ill-considered actions and decisions.’”13 Numerous social sci-
ence studies were brought to bear on this and other conclusions
reached by the Court regarding empirically demonstrated
developmental differences between adolescents and adults.
The Federal Rules of Evidence do not address Davis’s con-
cept of legislative fact. Rather, the Advisory Committee that
wrote the Rules stated that it could construct “no rule”14 to
address how courts should deal with legislative facts. It
appears from the Committee’s commentary to the Rules that
legislative facts can (a) be presented by the parties in briefs on
appeal; (b) be presented by the parties at trial by the testimony
of expert witnesses; (c) be found by the court through sua
sponte library research; or (d) be obtained by an appellate court
remanding a case back to the trial court “for the taking of evi-
dence.”15
Current Approaches
Criticism of the concept of legislative fact has focused on
three topics: How should social science research used to create
or modify law be obtained? Once obtained, how should it be
evaluated? And once evaluated, how should a court’s conclu-
sions about research be established so as to affect subsequent
courts that address the same empirical issue?16
On the first issue, the acknowledgement of the Advisory
Committee to the Federal Rules of Evidence that there was “no
rule” that addressed legislative facts has been taken by many to
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illustrate the “total failure”17 of the notion of legislative fact to
provide guidance to courts regarding how to obtain social sci-
ence research for the purpose of creating or modifying law.
After social science research has been obtained by some
unspecified procedure, the court must evaluate it. Social sci-
ence research varies enormously in quality, and the risk of bas-
ing a legal rule on flawed research is significant. Yet neither
Davis nor the Federal Rules that rely on his concept address
this issue at all.
Likewise, if one court draws conclusions from social science
research about an empirical assumption underlying a legal
rule, the concept of legislative fact gives no guidance to the
next judge who confronts the same empirical question. The
options for an appellate court, for example, range from defer-
ring to the trial court’s evaluation of the research under a
“clearly erroneous” standard of review to performing a “de
novo” evaluation of the studies. 
It is difficult, therefore, to gainsay the conclusion of a lead-
ing text on evidence that “a viable formulation of rules . . . with
regard to legislative facts has not proved feasible.”18
Improvements in the manner that courts use social science
information to create rules of law may be possible only by
abandoning the notion of legislative fact entirely and develop-
ing a new concept that fundamentally alters the ways in which
courts view social science materials. Social authority has been
proposed as one alternative to legislative fact as an organizing
principle for courts’ use of social science to create or modify a
rule of law. Under this rubric, courts would treat social science
research relevant to creating or modifying a rule of law as a
source of authority rather than a source of facts. More specifi-
cally, courts would treat social science research much as they
treat legal precedent under the common law.
In outline, the argument for this theory is that although
there is a clear conceptual analogy between social science
research and fact (both are “positive” in the sense that they
concern the way the world is, with no necessary implications
for the way the world ought to be), there is an equally clear
conceptual analogy between social science research and law
(both are “general” in that they produce principles applicable
beyond particular instances). It is, therefore, plausible to clas-
sify social science research either as fact or as law. The criterion
for classification—whether to give priority to the fact analogy
or to the law analogy—should depend on the quality of the
judicial procedures that flow from it.
A number of coherent procedures for obtaining, evaluating,
and establishing social science research flow from conceiving
of it as social authority rather than as legislative fact. Making
the heuristic presumption that courts should treat social sci-
ence data the same way they treat legal precedent produces two
19. Id. at 498: “At least four indices of precedential persuasiveness can
easily be abstracted from the jurisprudential literature: (1) cases
decided by courts higher in the appellate structure have more
weight than lower court decisions; (2) better reasoned cases have
more weight than poorly reasoned cases; (3) cases involving facts
closely analogous to those in the case at issue have more weight
than cases involving easily distinguished facts; and (4) cases fol-
lowed by other courts have more weight than isolated cases.”
20. For a discussion of how these dimensions can be made opera-
tional by courts, see Social Authority, supra note 16, at 498-508.
What trial or appellate courts should do when confronted with an
empirical question underlying a rule of law for which no research,
or only inadequate research, is available is discussed in  John
Monahan & Laurens Walker, Empirical Questions Without
Empirical Answers, 1991 WISCONSIN L. REV. 569.  
21. Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence, supra note 5, at 402.
22. E.g., THOMAS MARVELL, APPELLATE COURTS AND LAWYERS (1978).
23. Bowling v. Department of Ins., 394 So.2d 165, 174 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1981).
24. The Lanham Act is found at 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq.  The 1988
amendments are scattered throughout the Act. 
25. 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).
26. Oneida v. National Silver, 25 N.Y.S.2d 271 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940).
27. 216 F. Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
28. Id. at 682.
29. See SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW, supra note 1, at 95-130.
30. 204 F. Supp. 2d 968 (N.D. Tex. 2001).
31. Pharmacia Corp. v. Alcon Laboratories, 201 F. Supp.2d 335
(D.N.J. 2002).
corollary ideas about how a court should obtain empirical
research: The parties should present empirical research to the
court in written briefs, and judges may find social science
research by searching for it themselves. This is the way that
courts obtain the law. Oral testimony of expert witnesses and
remanding cases to the trial court to obtain evidence would be
disallowed. Likewise, under this view, the way that courts
should evaluate empirical data can be found in the way they
evaluate legal precedent. Courts should evaluate scientific
research studies along four dimensions analogous to those
used to evaluate case precedent:19 Courts should place confi-
dence in social science research to the extent that the research
(a) has survived the critical review of the scientific community,
(b) has used valid research methods, (c) is generalizable to the
legal question at issue, and (d) is supported by a body of other
research. Finally, because legal rules make clear that appellate
courts are not bound by trial courts’ conclusions about law,
appellate courts should also not be bound by trial courts’ con-
clusions about empirical research: De novo review is the
appropriate standard.20
USING SOCIAL SCIENCE TO DETERMINE FACTS
Early Approaches
Professor Davis defined adjudicative facts as follows:
“When an agency [or court] finds facts concerning immedi-
ate parties—what the parties did, what the circumstances were,
what the background conditions were—the agency [or court]
is performing an adjudicative function, and the facts may con-
veniently be called adjudicative facts.”21
Adjudicative facts, in other words, are facts that apply only
to the particular parties before the court. They are used to
determine (or “adjudicate”) what happened in a specific case,
and not for some larger purpose, such as to argue that the law
should be changed. What Davis called an adjudicative fact has
been referred to by other commentators as a “case fact”22 and
by one court as “a plain, garden-variety fact.”23
One of the most frequent uses of social science research as
adjudicative or case-specific facts involves trademarks. The
Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, as amended by the Trademark
Law Revision Act of 1988,24 states that the Patent and
Trademark Office will refuse to register a new trademark if it
so resembles a trademark already registered to another person
“as to be likely . . . to cause confusion.”25 A person who sells a
product that is likely to cause confusion with an already trade-
marked product is liable for trademark infringement. Social
science research in the form of surveys of consumers or poten-
tial consumers to ascertain the degree of confusion between
products has been admitted in American courts at least since
1940.26 Initially, such evidence was often successfully chal-
lenged as contravening the prohibition against hearsay, since
the respondents to the surveys were not present in court to tes-
tify. In Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Rogers Imports,27 however,
the hearsay objection was definitively laid to rest:
“The weight of case authority, the consensus of legal writ-
ers, and reasoned policy considerations all indicate that the
hearsay rule should not bar the admission of properly con-
ducted public surveys.”28
A wide variety of methodologies are now routinely used by
both plaintiffs and defendants in trademark cases to determine
the presence of consumer confusion.29 In Kis v. Foto Fantasy,30
for example, the plaintiff and the defendant both owned photo
booths that were placed inside shopping malls throughout the
United States. Foto Fantasy, the defendant, placed a sketch of
the actor Tom Cruise outside its booths, with a sign reading
“Scan in Your Favorite Celebrities.” Kis, the plaintiff, sued
Foto Fantasy for violating the Lanham Act by creating confu-
sion as to the association of Tom Cruise with defendant’s photo
booths, leading consumers to patronize Foto Fantasy booths
rather than Kis booths. To demonstrate consumer confusion,
Kis introduced as an expert witness a social scientist who con-
ducted an experiment in a shopping mall. In this experiment,
several hundred potential consumers (demographically
matched to the typical consumers of photo booths) were given
pictures of a photo booth. A random half of these potential
consumers were given pictures that included a sketch of Tom
Cruise, and a random half were given pictures of photo booths
without such a sketch. Of the subjects in the former group, 56
percent believed that the actor was associated with Foto
Fantasy booths, a view shared by only 7 percent of the subjects
in the later group. The court denied the defendant’s motion to
exclude the social science expert, and held that any alleged
methodological defects of the experiment went to the weight,
and not to the admissibility, of the evidence. The use of survey
research in consumer-confusion trademark cases like Kis has
become so routine that the failure of a trademark owner to
conduct a survey may now give rise to an adverse inference.31
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The party with the burden of proving an adjudicative fact such
as consumer confusion will be severely disadvantaged by a fail-
ure to provide the fact-finder with the best possible evidence.
The key to understanding how courts deal with social sci-
ence research used to determine an adjudicative or case-spe-
cific fact is that, unlike legislative facts, adjudicative facts are
susceptible to proof by the usual rules of evidence. Under the
Federal Rules of Evidence and similar state codes, the admissi-
bility of social science evidence of a case-specific fact turns on
the issue of “relevance.” According to Rule 401:
“‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence.”
There are two components to this definition.32 First, to be
relevant, evidence must bear on a fact that is “of consequence.”
This means that even flawlessly executed research is inadmis-
sible if the substantive law governing the case does not put in
issue the fact that the research seeks to demonstrate. Second,
evidence must make that fact “more probable or less probable”
than it would otherwise be. This means that even if social sci-
ence research directly addresses a fact of central concern to the
substantive law, it will not be admitted unless the research data
provide insight into the likelihood that the fact exists. The first
of these components of relevance is often called materiality and
the second probative value.
Note that under Rule 401 it is not necessary for social sci-
ence evidence to be determinative of a fact at issue in a case, or
even to make the existence of a fact, such as consumer confu-
sion, “more likely than not,” for the evidence to be admitted.
As long as the research has “any” tendency to be probative of
the existence of material fact, the evidence is relevant and
therefore presumptively admissible (that is, admissible unless
some other rule, such as Rule 403, excluding evidence on the
grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste of time, is violated). 
Obtaining social science research that bears on an adjudica-
tive fact, therefore, is governed by the normal rules of evi-
dence. Evaluating the research for the purpose of admissibility
is limited to determining whether it is material, whether it has
any probative value, and whether its admission violates any
other evidentiary rule. The ultimate weight to be placed on the
evidence is a matter for the fact-finder. As with any other adju-
dicative or case-specific fact, the standard of review an appel-
late court will apply to a trial court’s decisions regarding social
science evidence is “clear error.”
Current Approaches
The law regarding social science research used to determine
adjudicative facts (or what have been called “social facts”33 to
distinguish empirical research from historical case-specific
facts such as who-hit-whom) is much more settled than that
governing research used to determine legislative facts or social
authority. Such evidence is now routinely admitted not only in
trademark cases, but also in obscenity litigation,34 and many
other areas. Recently, social science research has come to play
a decisive role in adjudicating damages in mass-tort cases.35
One view of determining what is precedential about court
decisions on social science evidence used to ascertain adju-
dicative facts requires that a fundamental distinction be made
between the methodology of the research offered in evidence
and the application of that methodology in a particular case.36
Methodology refers to the broad research design employed to
generate the data and the analytic procedures used to interpret
them. Application refers to the concrete way that a particular
study was carried out. Under this view, precedent attaches only
to the generic methodology of studies—such as the use of a
particular statistical test—in a given area.37
USING SOCIAL SCIENCE TO PROVIDE CONTEXT
Early Approaches
Most of the judicial uses of social science fall into one of the
two categories originally described by Davis. In recent years,
however, courts have begun to confront uses of social science
research that do not conform to the established classification.
There are increasing indications that a new, third use of social
science in law is emerging. Examples can be found in cases con-
cerning eyewitness identification and sexual victimization.38
In Weatherred v. State,39 the state’s only direct evidence that
the defendant had committed murder was the word of two eye-
witnesses. At trial, the expert testimony of a research psychol-
ogist was offered by the defendant to counter the testimony of
the eyewitnesses. In a proffer of the evidence, the psychologist
described published studies on factors such as the speed with
which memory decays over time and the relationship between
the confidence of a witness and the accuracy of identification,
both of which were issues in the case. The trial court excluded
the expert. However, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
reversed and remanded the case for a new trial, stating that the
testimony survived a Daubert40 analysis and that “the trial
court abused its discretion in refusing to admit said evidence
before the jury.”41
32. Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Facts: Scientific
Methodology as Legal Precedent, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 877, 882-85
(1988) [hereinafter Social Facts].
33. Id. 
34. See, e.g., Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973); Saliba v. State,
475 N.E.2d 1181 (Ind. App. 1985). See generally SOCIAL SCIENCE
IN LAW, supra note 1, at 130-57.
35. Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Sampling Damages, 83 IOWA L.
REV. 545 (1998); Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Sampling
Liability, 85 VA. L. REV. 329 (1999).
36. Social Facts, supra note 32, at 885-87.
37. The application of a particular methodology in a given case would
be evaluated under the pertinent federal or state rules of evidence.
In federal courts, of course, this would mean an evaluation under
Federal Rule of Evidence 702, incorporating Daubert v. Merrill
Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
38. See generally SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW, supra note 1, at 383-605.
Other examples discussed there include the battered-woman and
rape-trauma syndromes.
39. 963 S.W.2d 115 (1998). See also John Brigham, Adina
Wasserman, and Christian Meissner, Disputed Eyewitness
Identification Evidence: Important Legal and Scientific Issues,  COURT
REVIEW, Summer 1999, at 12.
40. Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
41. Id. at  131.
42. 762 A.2d 833 (Vt. 2000).
43. Id. at 842.
44. Roper, 543 U.S. at 572.
45. Weatherred, 963 S.W.2d at 127.
46. Kinney, 762 A.2d at 839.
47. Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use
of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559, 570 (1987).
48. Id. at 583-584.
49. Id. at 587-98. For judicial discussions of this proposal, see State v.
Alger, 764 P.2d 119 (Idaho 1988); Skinner v. State, 33 P.3d 758
(Wyo. 2001); Steve Leben & Megan Moriarty, A Kansas Approach
to Custodial Parent Move-Away Cases, 37 WASHBURN L. J. 497, 524-
32 (1998). 
50. On the use of jury instructions to convey empirical information,
see State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986); State v. Cromedy, 727
A.2d 457 (N.J. 1999); State v. Ledbetter, 881 A.2d. 290 (Conn.
2005).
51. Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 509 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2007).
52. Id. at 1178.  See Declaration of William T. Bielby, Ph.D. in Support
of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification, at 5, Dukes v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., Case No. C-01-2252 MJJ (N.D. Cal. Feb. 3,
2003).
The defendant in State v. Kinney42 was found guilty of aggra-
vated sexual assault. The trial court had allowed the prosecu-
tion to introduce a social scientist as an expert witness to
describe “the behavioral patterns of victims of sexual assault,”
patterns that were also seen in the complainant (e.g., a delay in
reporting the crime). The defense objected to this evidence at
trial and appealed. The Supreme Court of Vermont upheld the
conviction, however, stating that the testimony survived a
Daubert analysis and that “expert evidence of rape trauma syn-
drome and the associated typical behavior of adult rape victims
is admissible to assist the jury in evaluating the evidence, and
frequently to respond to defense claims that the victim’s behav-
ior after the alleged rape is inconsistent with the claim that the
rape occurred.”43
In neither of these cases was social science research being
used to provide legislative facts. No creation or modification of
a rule of law was sought. Rather, in both cases the parties offer-
ing the research accepted the applicable legal rules and sought
to show that the research would help the jury to decide the
specific factual issues being litigated. Yet in neither of these
cases was social science research being used to provide adju-
dicative facts either. The parties to the cases were not involved
in the research at all: The experts relied on “off-the-rack”
research studies published before the events that gave rise to
the litigation took place.
The way social science was used in Weatherred and Kinney,
however, does reflect the defining characteristics of both leg-
islative fact and adjudicative fact. In each case, the research
used demonstrated the critical component of legislative fact—
generality. Just as the research used in Roper focused on “juve-
niles’ diminished culpability in general,”44 the research used in
Weatherred focused on factors that “on average” affect eyewit-
nesses.45 Similarly, the research in Kinney concerned symptoms
that victims of rape “commonly experience.”46 In each case,
the research also possessed the critical component of adjudica-
tive fact—specificity. Just as the research used in Kis spoke
only to whether consumers were confused between two given
products, the studies in Weatherred were used only to chal-
lenge the testimony of eyewitnesses to a particular crime, and
the research in Kinney was used only to show that the named
victim was, in fact, sexually assaulted.
The research used in these cases and many like them is thus
neither wholly legislative nor wholly adjudicative fact but has
the essential elements of both of the conventional categories.
Therefore, a third category has been proposed, termed social
framework,47 to denote the use of general conclusions from
social science research to determine factual issues in a specific
case.
Current Approaches
Social science research used as a social framework is becom-
ing common in American courts. It is now often introduced as
if it were simply an adjudicative fact—by expert testimony
before a jury, as it was in Weatherred and Kinney.
Commentators have pointed out that treating social frame-
works as adjudicative facts has two significant liabilities.48
First, it is an inefficient use of court time. The same testimony
about the same research studies must be heard in case after
case whenever a framework for a given type of factual deter-
mination is sought. Second, introducing frameworks as social
facts is expensive. The pool of expert witnesses is limited to a
small group of basic researchers in each topical area and those
researchers must be transported and paid to repeat their testi-
mony in each new case. Access to expert testimony is therefore
effectively precluded in a large number of cases in which the
introduction of a social framework would seem justified.
An alternative to treating social frameworks as if they were
simple adjudicative facts has been proposed that recognizes the
similarity of social frameworks to both adjudicative fact and
legislative fact as well.49 The proposal is for a two-stage set of
procedures for the judicial management of this use of social
science in court. First, the generality that social frameworks
share with research used as legislative fact or social authority
suggests analogous procedures for obtaining, evaluating, and
establishing social frameworks—obtain the research either in
briefs or through the court’s own investigation, evaluate it as
legal precedent is evaluated, and have one court’s decision on
a social framework affect later courts as one court’s decision on
a matter of law affects later courts. Second, the specificity that
social frameworks share with research used as adjudicative or
social fact suggests similar procedures for communicating the
court’s conclusions to the jury: via instruction.50 The jurors
would then be in a position to apply the general social frame-
work to the specific evidence produced at trial.
In Dukes v. Wal-Mart,51 the Ninth Circuit recently upheld
the certification of the largest employment-discrimination
class in history, with more than 1.5 million women employees
seeking over $1.5 billion in damages. A crucial piece of evi-
dence supporting class certification came from a sociologist
who testified that he performed a “social framework analysis”
to evaluate Wal-Mart “against what social science research
shows to be factors that create and sustain bias”52 and found
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In outline, our view is that courts should adhere to the
following steps when addressing an empirical question
concerning human behavior:
1. Determine whether the substantive law governing the
case raises an empirical issue to which social science
research may be pertinent.
2. If so, determine whether the empirical issue bears on an
assumption underlying the choice of a legal rule that has
general applicability, a factual dispute pertaining only to
the parties before the court, or a mixture of the two in
which general empirical information provides a context
for determining a specific fact.
3. If the empirical issue concerns an assumption underlying
the choice of a legal rule of general applicability:
a. Receive social science studies in briefs submitted by
the parties or amici.
b. If the parties or amici do not submit social science
studies, request such studies from the parties or amici,
or obtain them from the court’s own sua sponte inves-
tigation of published sources.
c. Evaluate any available research by determining
whether the research has survived the critical review
of the scientific community, has used valid research
methods, is generalizable to the legal issue in ques-
tion, and is supported by a body of related research.
d. If no acceptable research is available, candidly state
this conclusion in the opinion. In common-law cases,
rely upon the empirical assumption that appears to
be the most plausible. In reviewing state action, rely
upon the legally appropriate standard of review in
determining where to place responsibility for resolv-
ing the empirical issue.
4. If the empirical issue concerns a factual dispute bearing
only on the parties before the court:
a. Determine the party with the burden of proving the
contested fact.
b. Determine whether the law governing the case makes
empirical research an appropriate form of evidence
for meeting this burden.
c. If empirical research does constitute an appropriate
form of evidence, allow the admission of direct and
rebuttal expert testimony subject to the applicable
federal or state rules of evidence.
d. If the party with the burden of proof does not produce
relevant expert testimony, weigh this omission in
determining whether the burden has been met.
5. If the empirical issue concerns the provision of a general
context within which to determine a fact pertaining only
to the parties, then 
EITHER:
a. Obtain and evaluate social science research as spec-
ified in 3a-3c above.
b. In cases tried before a jury, communicate the conclu-
sions by means of jury instructions. 
OR:
c. Allow the admission of direct and rebuttal expert tes-
timony subject to the applicable federal or state rules
of evidence.
d. However, do not allow the expert to link general
research findings to a specific party before the court.
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the company wanting. As authority for introducing this analy-
sis, the expert—and the Ninth Circuit—relied on the work by
Walker and Monahan, described above, introducing the con-
cept of social framework.53 In a recent article,54 we reviewed
and recast the procedures originally proposed for apprising
juries of general research results to assist in resolving the case
before them.  
Experience over the past 20 years has shown that that
courts will typically allow general contextual information from
social science research to be conveyed to the jury by expert
witnesses rather than via instructions, as originally envisioned.
Where this occurs, we believe it essential that courts limit
expert testimony to a description of the findings of relevant
and reliable research and of the methodologies that produced
those findings, and preclude the witness from linking the gen-
eral research findings to alleged policies and practices of a spe-
cific firm.  The landmark class action of Dukes v. Wal-Mart
illustrates both the centrality of social framework evidence to
modern employment litigation, as well as the need for courts
to clarify and circumscribe the role of the experts who intro-
duce them.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The exponential growth of social science research dealing
with questions of relevance to the law and the increasing prac-
tice of courts in incorporating that research into legal decisions
combine to make the development of a coherent scheme for
the judicial management of social science information a prior-
ity for courts and scholars.55 There is longstanding agreement
that one legitimate use of social science is to assist in the crea-
tion and modification of legal rules of general applicability.
Legislative fact has been the rubric that has subsumed this use
of research for over 50 years. Given the elasticity and lack of
direction inherent in this concept, it is unlikely to hold sway
much longer. A second accepted use of social science is to pro-
vide adjudicative facts for resolving disputes specific to the
parties before a court. The law here is much more settled.
Finally, there is a trend rapidly gaining credibility in American
courts to use social science in a third way, as a social frame-
work providing a general empirical context within which to
determine specific facts at issue in a case. Procedures for the
judicial management of this new use of social science must
blend existing or proposed procedures for the management of
both the law-making and fact-finding uses of research.
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